Prospector: Analysis of Heap and Stack Overflows using Emulated Hardware
Asia Slowinska
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
<asia.slowinska@gmail.com>
Heap and stack buffer overflows are still among the most common attack vectors in intrusion attempts. We asked a simple question that is surprisingly difficult to answer: which bytes contributed to the overflow? By careful observation of all scenarios that may occur in overflows, we identified the information that needs to be tracked to pinpoint the offending bytes. There are many reasons why this is a hard problem. For instance, by the time an overflow is detected some of the bytes may already have been overwritten in the memory, creating gaps. Additionally, it is hard to tell the offending bytes apart from unrelated network data. In our solution, we tag data from the network with an age stamp whenever it is written to a buffer. Doing so allows us to distinguish between different bytes and ignore gaps, and provide precise analysis of the offending bytes. By tracing these bytes to protocol fields, we obtain accurate signatures that cater to polymorphic attacks.


Asia Slowinska is a second-year Ph.D. student in the Computer System Group at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam. Her research concerns network intrusion detection, signature generation, and honeypots. She is involved in the EU FP6 NoAH project.

She graduated from the Warsaw University in Poland, where she obtained M.Sc. in Mathematics, and M.Sc. in Computer Science. During her studies she also participated in One-Year Exchange Masters Program at Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam.




Last modified: Wed, 28 Feb 2007 16:14:06 +0100