Argos: securing IP communications against zero-day attacks
Georgios Portokalidis
Vrije Universiteit van Amsterdam
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As modern operating systems and software become larger and more complex, they are more likely to contain bugs, which may allow attackers to gain illegitimate access. A fast and reliable mechanism to discern and generate vaccines for such attacks is vital for the successful protection of networks and systems. In this paper we present Argos, a containment environment for worms as well as human orchestrated attacks. Argos is built upon a fast x86 emulator which tracks network data throughout execution to identify their invalid use as jump targets, function addresses, instructions, etc. Furthermore, system call policies disallow the use of network data as arguments to certain calls. When an attack is detected, we perform 'intelligent' process- or kernel-aware logging of the corresponding emulator state for further off-line processing. In addition, our own forensics shellcode is injected to gather information about the attacked process. By correlating the data logged by the emulator with the data collected from the network, the generation of accurate network intrusion detection signatures is made possible.


I obtained my bachelors in computer science from the University of Crete, in Heraklion, Greece in 2002. In 2005 I got my m.sc. in computer science from Leiden University. Currently I am a ph.d. student at the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam, under Henri Bal and Herbert Bos.

In the past I have worked on network monitoring and peer-to-peer systems. Currently, I am working on network security. My current project is partially funded by the Dutch NWO and the NoAH project. I have also worked as an internee in Intel Research Cambridge and Internet Hellas in Greece




Last modified: Sat, 24 Jun 2006 16:30:48 +0200